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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS: THE SCOTTISH EXPERIENCE 1975-1979 
N A FRASER & I ORTON 
In r e c e n t months r e g i o n a l p o l i c y has once more come under s c r u t i n y . The 
r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d S e l e c t Commit tee fo r S c o t t i s h A f f a i r s took r e g i o n a l 
p o l i c y as i t s f i r s t major t o p i c for i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r i t was 
concerned w i t h t he po tency of t h e e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s in 
a t t r a c t i n g mobile investment to Scot land. In s i m i l a r vein t h i s a r t i c l e i s 
concerned w i t h r e g i o n a l p o l i c y in S c o t l a n d and t h e r o l e t h a t i t p l a y s in 
d e t e r m i n g i n v e s t m e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y our main a ims a r e to show t h a t t h e 
p r e s e n t s y s t e m , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t he i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s , i s no t 
l i k e l y to produce s p a t i a l e q u a l i t y of economic oppor tun i ty ; nor in the l a s t 
a n a l y s i s i s i t n e c e s s a r i l y compat ible with any e f f i c i ency c r i t e r i a . 
At t h i s p o i n t however i t would be a p p r o p r i a t e t o make a number of g e n e r a l 
po in t s concerning r eg iona l po l i cy . In the f i r s t i n s t ance we are b a s i c a l l y 
concerned w i t h t h e payment of Reg iona l Development G r a n t s , aimed a t 
encouraging mobile c a p i t a l to l o c a t e in p a r t i c u l a r a r e a s , the Development 
and Spec ia l Development Areas, and a s s i s t i n g indigenous f i rms to undertake 
m a r g i n a l i n v e s t m e n t s . As such we a r e only conce rned w i t h t h e l o c a t i o n a l 
a spec t s of r e g i o n a l po l i cy ; not with other government spending programmes 
aimed a t improving r eg iona l performance. Second, while we are c r i t i c a l of 
the system as i t s t ands we are not c r i t i c a l of r eg iona l pol icy per se . The 
var ious reasons for advocat ing a more balanced d i s t r i b u t i o n of the n a t i o n ' s 
populat ion and economic r e sources seem to be fundamentally sound. And the 
presen t system has not been unsuccessful in procur ing such an arrangement. 
W i t h i n t h e S c o t t i s h c o n t e x t t h e r e h a s been some n a r r o w i n g of t h e 
unemployment d i f f e r e n t i a l . F u r t h e r t h e m a j o r i t y , i f no t a l l , of t h e 
a t t e m p t s t o e v a l u a t e r e g i o n a l p o l i c y have conc luded t h a t i t does have a 
b e n e f i c i a l p o t e n c y . A c c o r d i n g l y , g iven t h a t a r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e h a s , 
n o n e t h e l e s s , s t i l l no t o c c u r r e d a s t r o n g r e g i o n a l p o l i c y should c o n t i n u e . 
However we con tend t h a t t h e r e a r e grounds fo r changing t h e r u l e s . In 
summary by making r e g i o n a l p o l i c y more d i s c r e t i o n a r y i t s po tency and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be improved. 
According to the government the primary aim of r eg iona l pol icy i s , 
" to b r i n g supp ly and demand fo r l a b o u r in t he a s s i s t e d 
a r e a s more c l o s e l y i n t o b a l a n c e by s a f e g u a r d i n g e x i s t i n g 
employment and c r e a t i n g new jobs in those a r ea s . 
A b r o a d e r aim which to some e x t e n t may e n c a p s u l a t e t h i s aim i s t o p r o v i d e 
s e l f s u s t a i n i n g r e g i o n a l g r o w t h . Indeed g iven the n a t u r e of r e g i o n a l 
s u b s i d i e s which 
"have been a s s o c i a t e d d i r e c t l y w i th i n v e s t m e n t , only 
i n d i r e c t l y with employment, and s t i l l more i n d i r e c t l y with 
unemployment" 
We would l i k e to t hank A L i t t l e and A Morton for a s s i s t a n c e in t h e 
compi la t ion of da ta , and Dr I McNicoll for he lpfu l comments on the impact of 
investment spending. Any e r r o r s a r e , of course , our own. 
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t h i s maybe in p r a c t i c e prove to be t h e more r e a l i s t i c view. N o n e t h e l e s s 
employment c r ea t i on would appear to be the main aim of reg ional pol icy , and 
accordingly the main c r i t e r i o n upon which reg iona l pol icy should be based. 
Indeed d e s p i t e the dichotomy between aims and p o l i c i e s employment c rea t ion 
has usua l ly been the c r i t e r i o n used by policy e v a l u a t i o n s . 
However t h i s i s only one s ide of the equat ion. Regional policy has a cos t , 
both in r e a l and monetary t e r m s . The r e s o u r c e s used in imp lemen t ing a 
l o c a t i o n a l p o l i c y could be used in p o t e n t i a l l y more p r o d u c t i v e p r o j e c t s : 
the r e s u l t of having a more d e c e n t r a l i s e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of indust ry may not 
for example be compatible with secur ing p o s i t i v e economic growth. As such 
i t can be argued t h a t some c o s t c r i t e r i a shou ld be a p p l i e d to r e g i o n a l 
p o l i c y . And a t p r e s e n t , i t can be argued a l b e i t on an i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c 
b a s i s t h a t the presen t system i s not resource e f f e c t i v e . 
Cons ider t h e r a t i o n a l e behind t h e p r e s e n t p o l i c y of i n v e s t m e n t s u b s i d i e s . 
Th i s seems to be an e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of t he f a c t t h a t t he m a r g i n a l 
e f f i c i e n c y of c a p i t a l v a r i e s be tween d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s . In a s s i s t e d 
a r ea s , i t i s low r e l a t i v e to the remainder of the economy. Accordingly, in 
t h e absence of s u b s i d i e s , i n v e s t m e n t and job c r e a t i o n would be r e l a t i v e l y 
low, and unemployment would o c c u r . Usua l ly t he m a r g i n a l e f f i c i e n c y of 
c a p i t a l d i f f e r e n t i a l i s e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of economic s t r u c t u r e between 
s t rugg l ing and prosperous regions or , more impor tan t ly given the cumulative 
na ture of reg iona l development, because of the emergence of agglomeration 
economies in t h e l a t t e r a r e a s . As such t h e i n v e s t m e n t subs idy could be 
c o n s i d e r e d as a s u b s t i t u t e fo r a g g l o m e r a t i o n economies in the s t r u g g l i n g 
reg ions . The aim of reg iona l pol icy would accordingly be to equa l i se the 
l o c a t i o n i n c e n t i v e s over the whole space economy. 
In p r a c t i c e however r e g i o n a l p o l i c y i s not a p p l i e d in such a manner. Any 
a s s e s s m e n t of i n d i v i d u a l f i rm or s e c t o r a l m a r g i n a l r e t u r n on c a p i t a l or 
a p p r a i s a l of l o c a t i o n a l advan tage i m p l i e s a f i n e g r a i n approach to p o l i c y 
implementat ion. A fu r the r necessary co ro l l a ry i s t h a t net investment w i l l 
produce more j o b s . In both i n s t a n c e s t h i s i s not t he case in B r i t a i n . 
Despite the p leas f i r s t heard in the Hunt Committee Report^ on In te rmed ia te 
Areas for a s e r i e s of i n d i c a t o r s the so le requirement for des ignat ion as a 
Development or S p e c i a l Development Area, t he s p a t i a l u n i t of r e g i o n a l 
p o l i c y , i s t h a t unemployment i s r e a c h i n g a c r i t i c a l l e v e l . As such once 
des igna ted , investment subs id i e s paid wi thin these areas can go to any firm 
or i n d u s t r y i r r e s p e c t i v e of t he m a r g i n a l r a t e of r e t u r n , or, of t he 
l i ke l i hood of a d d i t i o n a l employment being c rea ted . 
Consider t h e case of an i n d u s t r y s i t u a t e d in a Development Area which i s 
enjoying d i s t r i c t l o c a t i o n a l advantages . Clear ly i t i s of no consequence 
i f i t r e c e i v e s i n v e s t m e n t s u b s i d i e s or no t . I t s l o c a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e , 
a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o a raw m a t e r i a l or marke t ; a l o c a l a g g l o m e r a t i o n economy 
w i l l , we can assume, compensate for t h i s . S imi l a r ly in contemplat ing the 
i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n a f i rm e n j o y i n g bumper p r o f i t s w i l l p robab ly not be 
adversely influenced by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of investment subs id i e s . In both 
i n s t a n c e s t h e r e f o r e , i t can be conc luded t h a t i n v e s t m e n t s u b s i d i e s may be 
au toma t i ca l l y hived off as surp lus p r o f i t , a s t r a i g h t t r a n s f e r from taxpayer 
to shareholder . Fur the r , as we have already noted, given the fac t t ha t i t 
i s i n v e s t m e n t r a t h e r than l a b o u r t h a t i s be ing s u b s i d i s e d t h e r e i s no 
g u a r a n t e e t h a t , in t he even t of n e t i n v e s t m e n t t a k i n g p l a c e t h a t e x t r a 
employment w i l l acc rue . 
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TABLE 1 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS (OVER £25,000) PAID IN SCOTLAND 1975-
1979 (£'000s 1975 PRICES) 
DISTRICT 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Caithness 
Sutherland 
Ross & Cromarty 
Skye & Lochalsh 
Lochaber 
Inverness 
Badenoch & Speyside 
Nairn 
Orkney 
Shetland 
Western Isles 
Moray 
Banff & Buchan 
Gordon 
Aberdeen City 
Kincardine & Deeside 
Angus 
Dundee City 
Perth & Kinross 
Kircaldy 
North East Fife 
Dunfermline 
West Lothian 
Edinburgh City 
Midlothian 
East Lothian 
Clackmannan 
Stirling 
Falkirk 
Tweeddale 
Ettrick & Lauderdale 
Roxburgh 
Berwickshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dumbarton 
Glasgow City 
Clydebank 
Bearsden & Milngavie 
Strathkelvin 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
Cumbernauld & Kilsyth 
Monklands 
Motherwell 
Hamilton 
East Kilbride 
Eastwood 
Lanark 
Renfrew 
Inverolyde 
Cunninghame 
Kilmarnock & Loudon 
Kyle & Carrick 
Cumnock & Doon Valle; 
Wigtown 
Stewarty 
Nithsdale 
Annandale & Eskdale 
TOTAL 
1 
6 
1 
3 
y 
41 
1975 
0 
0 
,509 
118 
31 
504 
0 
32 
0 
0 
161 
7 40 
259 
133 
,339 
0 
928 
703 
589 
,377 
27 
295 
735 
984 
338 
23 
,370 
191 
,594 
34 
60 
112 
214 
,295 
574 
,371 
780 
48 
733 
26 
,600 
,296 
288 
613 
0 
0 
,177 
409 
,991 
120 
372 
286 
39 
0 
314 
533 
,284 
1976 
0 
22 
807 
0 
102 
666 
0 
126 
3,701 
153 
589 
1,184 
805 
102 
1,672 
0 
1,570 
645 
477 
2,086 
23 
660 
813 
1,189 
244 
23 
657 
0 
3,113 
25 
132 
29 
31 
369 
1,263 
6,955 
277 
0 
736 
106 
1,716 
11,692 
447 
295 
0 
54 
1,473 
807 
4,762 
81 
546 
390 
84 
0 
530 
37 
54,266 
1977 
1 
1 
6 
4 
2 
6 
1 
3 
38 
0 
0 
,079 
. 0 
75 
237 
0 
0 
0 
0 
282 
102 
164 
75 
788 
165 
998 
315 
78 
,383 
172 
468 
896 
747 
605 
131 
108 
323 
,387 
24 
88 
0 
36 
23 
701 
,425 
213 
25 
142 
178 
,092 
,868 
576 
147 
0 
145 
,576 
991 
,264 
306 
511 
176 
0 
162 
199 
262 
,712 
1978 
85 
0 
357 
0 
43 
285 
31 
0 
0 
54 
0 
184 
717 
0 
1,591 
48 
733 
657 
38 
1,397 
254 
289 
1,908 
3,072 
155 
806 
317 
18 
9,153 
26 
41 
17 
0 
293 
393 
6,222 
112 
0 
262 
222 
1,492 
10,707 
675 
552 
0 
0 
1,621 
1,157 
2,044 
190 
496 
279 
27 
0 
295 
780 
50,097 
1979 
0 
0 
142 
0 
22 
168 
0 
0 
0 
0 
62 
182 
3,258 
31 
1,404 
0 
310 
743 
152 
1,523 
43 
229 
918 
2,337 
185 
16 
652 
193 
2,998 
0 
46 
25 
0 
0 
38 
3,570 
188 
0 
158 
259 
679 
3,687 
30 
299 
0 
0 
857 
491 
785. 
490 
198 
55 
77 
0 
864 
737 
29,104 
TOTAL 
85 
22 
3,893 
118 
272 
1,860 
31 
158 
3,701 
207 
1,095 
2,392 
5,204 
340 
6,795 
213 
4,539 
3,063 
1,334 
8,766 
519 
1,941 
5,270 
8,329 
1,528 
999 
3,104 
725 
23,246 
108 
367 
184 
281 
1,980 
2,969 
27,542 
1,589 
73 
2,031 
791 
7,579 
39,250 
2,016 
1,907 
0 
199 
6,703 
3,855 
14,846 
1,188 
2,123 
1,186 
227 
162 
2,203 
2,349 
213,463 
RANK 
52 
55 
13 
50 
42 
28 
54 
49 
15 
45 
34 
19 
11 
40 
8 
44 
12 
17 
31 
5 
38 
26 
10 
6 
30 
35 
16 
37 
3 
51 
39 
47 
41 
25 
18 
2 
29 
53 
23 
36 
7 
1 
24 
27 
56 
46 
9 
14 
4 
32 
22 
33 
43 
48 
21 
20 
Source: British Business (Trade and Industry) 
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THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS 
The geographic distribution of regional development grants with Scotland is 
of considerable importance to those concerned with regional industrial 
policy and in assisting those parts of the country with the most intractable 
problems of unemployment. This section examines the payment of grants to 
firms in the 56 administrative districts of Scotland. 
Table 1 presents the amount paid to each district over the period 1975 to 
1979 in contant 1975 prices. The total paid each year varies considerably 
with the total paid in 1979 representing only 38? of that paid in 1976. It 
is however the payments to individual districts that is our principal 
concern. 
Four districts have done appreciably better than others in attracting 
grants. Motherwell, Glasgow, Falkirk and Cunninghame attracted ^9% of the 
money paid out between 1975 and 1979. As can be seen from Table 2 this has 
had little impact on unemployment. 
TABLE 2 
DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
11.12.75 6.12.79 
Motherwell Area 7.9 11.3 
Glasgow City 6.7 8.9 
Falkirk & Grangemouth 5.4 6.8 
Cunninghame (Irvine) 8.2 13.8 
(Kilwinning) 
(Saltcoats) 
Scotland 6.1 7.9 
Source: Department of Employment 
These areas with the exception of Falkirk and parts of Cunninghame are 
Special Development Areas and as such one would expect them to attract the 
bulk of the funds. With regard to Motherwell and Falkirk one does not have 
to look far to see where the funds are going, a point which will be dealt 
with in the next section. 
Not all the SDA's, however, have received large sums of money in regional 
development grants. For example Dundee, Cumnock, Inverclyde, Strathkelvin 
all come behind a number of less favoured areas in amount of funds granted. 
Of course areas with large populations would be expected to attract a 
substantial proportion of money paid so Table 3 presents the amount paid to 
each district at 1975 prices on a per capita basis. 
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TABLE 3 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS - PER CAPITA TOTALS 1975-1979 (£*OOOs 
1975 PRICES 
DISTRICT 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Caithness 
Sutherland 
Ross & Cromarty 
Skye & Lochalsh 
Loohaber 
Inverness 
Badenoch & Strathspey 
Nairn 
Orkney 
Shetland 
Western Isles 
Moray 
Banff & Buchan 
Gorden 
Aberdeen City 
Kincardine & Deeside 
Angus 
Dundee City 
Perth & Kinross 
Kircaldy 
North East Fife 
Dumfermline 
West Lothian 
Edinburgh City 
Midlothian 
East Lothian 
Clackmannan 
Stirling 
Falkirk 
Tweeddale 
Ettrick & Lauderdale 
Roxburgh 
Berwickshire 
Argyll & Bute 
Dumbarton 
Glasgow City 
Clydebank 
Bearsden & Milngavie 
Strathkelvin 
Cumbernauld & Kilsyth 
Monklands 
Motherwell 
Hamilton 
East Kilbride 
Eastwood 
Lanark 
Renfrew 
Inverclyde 
Cunninghame 
Kilmarnock & Loudon 
Kyle & Carrick 
Cumnock & Doon Valley 
Wigtown 
Stewartry 
Nithsdale 
Annandale & Eskdale 
TOTAL 
TOTAL (1975-79) 
2.9 
1.9 
99.3 
12.3 
13.7 
35.0 
3.3 
16.9 
209.1 
11.2 
37.0 
29.7 
69.1 
7.1 
32.3 
6.2 
51.5 
15.7 
11.2 
59.3 
8.0 
15.7 
43.5 
17.7 
18.2 
12.7 
65.2 
9.2 
162.8 
7.8 
11.4 
5.1 
16.1 
30.6 
37.1 
31.3 
28.1 
1.9 
25.3 
14.6 
69.7 
245.9 
18.9 
23.5 
0 
3.6 
32.1 
36.4 
113.0 
14.3 
19.1 
24.4 
7.6 
7.2 
39.3 
66.7 
2,008.7 
RANK 
53 
54 
5 
39 
37 
17 
52 
31 
2 
42 
15 
22 
7 
48 
18 
49 
11 
33 
41 
10 
44 
33 
12 
30 
29 
38 
9 
43 
3 
45 
40 
50 
32 
21 
14 
20 
23 
54 
24 
35 
6 
1 
28 
26 
56 
51 
19 
16 
4 
36 
27 
25 
46 
47 
13 
8 
38 
A number of districts can be seen to fall away badly on a per capita basis. 
In absolute terms Glasgow City received the second largest sum but was only 
ranked twenty in Table 3. Dundee City fares badly as well, falling down to 
thirty three in the per capita ranking. Both of these SDA's receive a lot 
less on this basis than many areas with less intractable problems of 
unemployment. One unemployment balckspot which fares better on a per 
capita basis is the Western Isles. 
Overall the rankings do, however, show marked similarities between the 
tables. The Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation is equal to 0.88, 
indicating a close association between the two rankings. This ordinal 
measure nevertheless, fails to highlight the fact that a number of areas 
appear to benefit more than others on a per capita basis despite differences 
in development status. 
Geographically, this may be emphasised by considering two districts which 
have enjoyed the fruits of oil-related developments. Banff and Buchan has 
a high ranking in both Tables 1 and 2 despite having only development area 
status during the study period. Likewise Aberdeen City ranks highly 
despite being downgraded to Intermediate Area status in April 1977. 
With regard to Aberdeen, the changes in status has had little influence on 
the amount of money received in grants. It would appear that a greater 
level of investments at the lower rate of grant have attracted as much money 
as a lower level of investments at the higher rate of grant. Presumably 
investment in this area is not determined by the level of regional 
development grant paid. 
Such a situation is hardly surprising, nor is Banff and Buchan's high 
ranking, given the level of North Sea oil activity in these districts. 
Consequently, the present government has, downgraded these areas (along with 
a number of others) to non-assisted areas. It is by no means certain that 
the financial resources freed by these measures will be taken up by firms in 
the assisted areas. The assisted areas may now appear relatively more 
attractive to mobile capital but as much of this is North Sea related on can 
not hold much hope. 
The status an area enjoys does not have an overriding influence on the 
amount of grant received. Indeed the geographic necessity to be in certain 
areas appears to have a stronger influence. However, as the following 
section highlights it appears to be the type of industry which is located in 
a district which is of principal importance. 
THE SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS 
The payment of regional development grants by the British government to 
firms in the various categories of assisted areas takes no account of the 
industrial sector in which those firms operate. This section examines the 
amount of grant paid to each of 20 industrial sectors over the past five 
years. This breakdown is important as different sectors have different 
investment patterns, profit levels and expectations regarding future 
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development. Fur ther the impact of d i f f e r e n t f i rms investment expendi tu res 
on S c o t t i s h output v a r i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y . 
Table 4 p r e s e n t s t h e p e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l g r a n t s pa id t o each i n d u s t r i a l 
sec to r over the period 1975-1979. 
Three s e c t o r s c l e a r l y a t t r a c t a g r e a t e r percentage of the g ran t s a v a i l a b l e . 
Between them, Food, Drink & Tobacco, Oil & Chemicals and Metal Manufacture 
accoun t fo r 53.4% of g r a n t s pa id in S c o t l a n d . In c u r r e n t p r i c e s t h i s 
r e p r e s e n t s a t o t a l of over £144 m i l l i o n . S h i p b u i l d i n g and V e h i c l e s 
r ece ive a s i z e a b l e 9.2% while payments to most o ther s e c t o r s are more evenly 
d i s t r i b u t e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , our a t t e n t i o n s h a l l c e n t r e on t h o s e t h r e e 
s e c t o r s in r e c e i p t of the l a r g e s t payments. 
Given t h e l a r g e amount of money awarded t o t h e l a r g e s t t h r e e s e c t o r s and 
f o l l o w i n g on from c o n t e n t i o n s made so f a r , i t seems a p p r o p r i a t e to ask 
whe the r or n o t r e g i o n a l i n v e s t m e n t g r a n t s i n f l u e n c e t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t 
dec is ion or simply provide a welcome boost to t h e i r cash flow. 
Oil and chemica ls rece ived more than £58m in r eg iona l investment g r a n t s over 
t h e p e r i o d 1975 t o 1 9 7 9 . T h i s i n d u s t r y i s d o m i n a t e d by g i a n t 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s which y e a r in year out show v a s t p r o f i t s . The i r own 
r e s o u r c e s coup led w i t h t h e i r s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s 
such t h a t t hey shou ld have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y in a t t r a c t i n g new i n v e s t m e n t 
funds. As such the only reason one could envisage for the payment of such 
monies i s t o a t t r a c t i n v e s t m e n t s which o t h e r w i s e would be s i t u a t e d 
e l s e w h e r e . Howeve r , t h e s i t u a t i o n i n S c o t l a n d i s such t h a t t h e 
g e o g r a p h i c a l need to be near t h e North Sea s u g g e s t s t h a t t he bulk of t h e s e 
inves tments would have been undertaken r e g a r d l e s s of the payment of reg iona l 
i n c e n t i v e s . Deve lopments a t St F e r g u s , Sul lom Voe, Nigg and Grangemouth 
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e new d e v e l o p m e n t s a t Moss Moran in F i f e a r e obv ious 
examples. 
The payment of £49m to the metal manufacture indus t ry between 1975 and 1979 
must a l s o be q u e s t i o n e d . The bu lk of t h i s money has gone t o t h e B r i t i s h 
Stee l Corpora t ion , a n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r y . In t h i s i n s t ance the payment 
of r e g i o n a l i n c e n t i v e s r e p r e s e n t s no more than an i n t e r n a l t r a n s f e r of 
r e s o u r c e s from one arm of government to a n o t h e r . I t would seem more 
a p p r o p r i a t e fo r government to d e v e l o p and fund an i n v e s t m e n t s t r a t e g y fo r 
the s t e e l i ndus t ry wi thout absorbing re sources earmarked to provide r eg iona l 
i n c e n t i v e s . 
The food, dr ink and tobacco indus t ry i s made up of f i rms which vary in s i z e 
cons iderably from smal l p r i v a t e l y owned companies to l a rge m u l t i - n a t i o n a l 
groups. Between 1975 and 1979 f i rms in t h i s s ec to r received over £36.5m in 
r eg iona l development g r a n t s . Unlike the o ther two groups i t i s fa r harder 
to g e n e r a l i s e about the e f f e c t these g r a n t s have on investment d e c i s i o n s . 
While the s t r u c t u r e and p r o f i t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s i s impor tan t , 
fu r ther measures to a s s e s s the impact of investment spending are necessary . 
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TABLE 4 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS - SCOTLAND % 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Mining & Quarrying 
Food, Drink & Tobacco 
Oil and Chemicals 
Textiles 
Construction 
Other Manufacturing 
Paper & Printing 
Mechanical Engineering 
Electrical Engineering 
Ships and Vehicles 
Metal Good nes 
Finance 
Transport 
Metal Manufacture 
Property & Leasing 
Bricks & Pottery 
Development Corporations 
Councils 
Distribution 
Timber & Furniture 
1975 
5.0 
18.0 
9.3 
1.7 
4.1 
2.5 
6.9 
7.4 
3.7 
12.5 
0.3 
1.8 
0 
17.2 
1.1 
4.9 
0.2 
0.4 
2.5 
0.5 
1976 
4.0 
16.5 
19.6 
1.2 
2.4 
0.4 
4.7 
7.3 
3.1 
8.0 
0.9 
1.8 
1.4 
20.2 
1.3 
2.7 
0.1 
0 
3.4 
0.9 
1977 
5.9 
7.0 
21.0 
1.7 
4.1 
1.0 
3.2 
5.7 
4.5 
12.8 
1.7 
2.1 
0.8 
19.0 
2.4 
1.6 
0.2 
0.1 
4.2 
0.9 
1978 
2.2 
11.3 
24.6 
2.4 
3.5 
2.1 
3.4 
4.2 
5.2 
8.2 
0.7 
1.7 
0.1 
21.6 
6.2 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
1.4 
0.4 
1979 
0.5 
16.0 
31.0 
3.7 
1.2 
4.6 
6.4 
5.8 
5.9 
5.8 
3.0 
1.0 
0 
10.5 
3.8 
0.1 
0.4 
0 
0.2 
0.2 
TOTAL 
3.4 
13.6 
21.6 
2.1 
3.0 
2.0 
4.7 
6.0 
4.5 
9.2 
1.3 
1.7 
0.5 
18.2 
3.2 
1.9 
0.2 
0.1 
2.3 
0.6 
100 100 100 100 100 
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One widely used method is through the use of output multipliers derived from 
an input/output table. These measure the effect in total output resulting 
from an increase in demand for the products of a particular industry. These 
must, however, be adjusted as our interest lies in the impact of an increase 
in investment spending. 
In order to assess the impact of new investment attention must be given to 
the capital/output ratio of the industry under consideration. The 
capital/output ratio can be said to show the investment required to produce 
one unit of direct output. This, however, does not measure fully the 
complete impact of capital expenditure. Clearly, such spending has 
repurcussions on other sectors of the economy and one must take into acount 
these indirect and induced effects. Multiplying the inverse of the 
capital/output ratio (ie the direct output created by one unit of 
investment) by an output multiplier derived from an input/output table, an 
estimate can be made of the increase in total Scottish output created by one 
unit of investment. Table 5 shows the estimates obtained for the three 
sectors which receive the bulk of regional development grants. 
TABLE 5 IMPACT OF INVESTMENT SPENDING ON THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY BY CERTAIN 
INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 
FOOD, DRINK 
& TOBACCO 
METAL 
MANUFACTURE 
OIL AND 
CHEMICALS 
1. Investment required to 
produce one unit direct 
output 
0.638 1.35 2.02 
Direct output created by 
one unit of investment 
1.567 0 . 7 4 1 0.495 
Total output created by 
one unit of investment 
(Total - direct + indirect 
+ induced) 
3.87 1.66 0.837 
4. Investment required to 
produce one unit of total 
output 
0.258 0.60 1.19 
The data used to construct Urs i s table is based on work by J J Jones and by 
H M Al-Ali and R Burdekin . The capital output ratios in the Jones 
article are rather dated but are the only available published figures to the 
best of our knowledge. As such one must not attach great importance to the 
absolute values presented. The point of the exercise is, however, to 
emphasise that the impact investment spending has on Scottish output varies 
between industrial sectors. This is a matter of significance in providing 
funds for regional development. 
With regard to employment in Scotland, these three sectors accounted for 
only 7.45% of total employment in Scotland. 
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TABLE 6 
EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY FOR SCOTLAND 197A AND 1979 
1974 1979 
THOUSANDS * THOUSANDS J 
Food, Drink & Tobacco 99 4.75 90 4.3 
Coal, Oil & Chemicals 31 1.49 31 1.48 
Metal Manufacture 43 2.06 35 1.67 
Total 2,084 100 2,093 100 
Source: Scottish Economic Bulletin Spring 1980 
As can be seen from Table 6 the absolute number employed in these sectors 
has fallen since 1974 as has the relative importance of these sectors for 
total employment. The payment of regional development grants may have 
slowed down the decline but they have not increased total employment in 
these sectors. 
The emphasis of this section has been to highlight the differences between 
the investment decisions of industries and the impact their investment 
spending has on the Scottish economy. These undoubtedly vary considerably. 
It is our contention that in periods of financial stringency a more 
efficient allocation of regional development grants should be devised. The 
payment of large sums of money to highly profitable firms who have access to 
investment funds is clearly a waste of resources. 
Attention must come to focus on those investments which are marginal, on 
investments which might go elsewhere and on those which have greatest impact 
on the Scottish economy. In conclusion, we offer some suggestions for 
alternatives to the present blanket system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, it can be seen that the current system of paying regional 
development grants is not working to full advantage. The level of 
investment has not been distributed over space according to need; 
unemployment has not necessarily been reduced in the troubled areas; 
wealthy, profitable companies receive vast investment subsidies; sectors 
which receive the most aid often tend to be very capital intensive. More 
efficient measures must evolve to assist both mobile and indigenous firms to 
create employment and generate a greater level of economic activity. 
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While it must be admitted that there are no easy answers to these conundra a 
first step may be to make regional policy more discretionary. Investment 
subsidies could be related to the expected return on investment (ie 
profits), the degree of risk, the employment likely to be generated, or the 
location of the investment. The more 'deserving' the case the higher the 
subsidy; and vice-versa. If an improvement in economic structure is 
required then the rules can be changed accordingly. Desirable industries 
would attract a higher rate of subsidy. Further the government could 
extend the range of activities over which it is prepared to subsidise. One 
such area could be the encouragement of research and development activity. 
Research in any sphere is usually expensive and often unprofitable yet there 
seems to be evidence to suggest a high level of association between the 
presence of research facilities and spin off employment creation within the 
vacinity of the facility. 
Another alternative which has recently attracted influential support is the 
reintroduction of a regional employment premium. This represents a direct 
subsidy nelated to the numbers employed by a firm. As such it has obvious 
attractions. However, if such payments were paid on a blanket basis many 
of the criticisms aimed at investment subsidies could be levied at 
employment subsidies. 
It is inappropriate to provide assistance on any one single criterea, be it 
investment subsidy or employment subsidy. Policy should be more 
discretionary, taking into account a wide range of factors. This may 
result in increased administrative costs but at the end of the day should 
increase the overall effectiveness of regional policy. 
Some discretionary payments are made, but represent only a small proportion 
of regional development payments. 
APPENDIX 
The data used in this study has been compiled from information published by 
the Department of Industry. Each quarter the Department's magazine British 
Business (formerly Trade and Industry) lists payments of regional 
development grants over £25,000. As such there may be some bias to 
industrial sectors with large investment programmes. Grants over £25,000 
have, however, accounted for the bulk of regional development fund payments. 
This information has been converted to constant 1975 prices. The deflators 
used were calculated from a quarterly series of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation presented in Economic Trends. 
44 
REFERENCES 
1. UK Regional Development Programme submitted to European Regional 
Development Fund (1977). 
2. Marquand, J - Measuring the Effects and Costs of Regional Incentives. 
Government Economic Service Working Paper No 32 Department of Industry 
(1980) 
3. Hunt Report - The Intermediate Areas Cmnd 3998 HMSO (1969). 
4. Jones, T T - Sectoral Income and Multiplier Effects Scotland 1963. 
University of Dundee Department of Economics Occasional Paper No1 
(1975) 
5. H M Al-Ali and Burdekin, R - An Analysis of Some Aspects of the 
Scottish Using Input/Output Techniques (1978). 
